One cognitive advancement in adolescence is metacognition, what does metacognition mean?

Metacognition is the awareness and control of one's own cognition. The construct of metacognition has been useful to researchers and educators seeking an explanation for why some students fare better in school than others. The consistent finding in over 30 years of research is that more-successful students exhibit higher levels of metacognitive knowledge about a given domain and are more skilled at regulating their cognitive processes than less-successful students. This article addresses issues regarding definitions, origins, measurement, and intervention. It highlights prominent research findings in the academic domains of reading, writing, mathematics, and science.

Metacognitive Research

Research on metacognition has its roots in two distinct areas of research: developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. Metacognitive research in the area of developmental psychology can be traced back to the theory proposed by Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. However, metacognitive research in a pure form did not emerge until the 1970s, when Flavell and colleagues investigated children's knowledge of their own cognitions. They were interested in finding out if the improvement in children's memory abilities was a function of greater conscious understanding of the rules that govern memory and cognition. Thus, the studies trace the development of metacognitive thinking, that is, the ability to reflect on one's own cognitive processes.

In the area of cognitive psychology, work on metacognition was initiated by the investigation on feeling of knowing experiences (FOKs). First, people were given a recall test, of either newly learned information or general knowledge. For example, participants might have been asked, “What is the capital city of the Bahamas?” (Nassau). If the participant was unsuccessful at recall, the participant was asked to make a feeling-of-knowing judgment, predicting the answer would be recognized in a multiple-choice format. Finally, the participant received the recognition test. It was shown that feeling-of-knowing judgments did indeed predict the likelihood of correct recognition for general knowledge materials, an observation replicated many times. However, in mainstream cognitive psychology, metacognition still lingered at the fringes. Indeed, at most conferences, metacognition researchers presented their papers in memory sessions not metacognition sessions. In the twenty-first century metacognition has emerged as an important subfield of cognitive psychology. Perhaps in part, the emergence of metacognition into the mainstream reflects the greater focus of cognitive psychologists on the experiential aspects of memory.

Research in metacognition has covered mainly three components: (a) knowledge about strategies (knowledge about when, where, and why different strategies should be used); (b) strategy use (the actual use of metacognitive strategies); and (c) cognitive monitoring (an acquisition procedure needed for evaluating and changing strategy use and for determining the limits of the knowledge). Among the conclusions reached by metacognitive research to date are that: (a) knowing about knowing develops; (b) both children and adults often fail to monitor cognitions; and (c) some strategies are difficult to learn and easy to abandon.

The fact that the link between metacognition and thinking skills, which encouraged application of the former to improve the latter has resulted in a number of researchers focusing on groups with learning difficulties. The view that metacognitive processes of self-monitoring and self-regulation are fundamental determinants of competent functioning in the real world has resulted in several research studies relating metacognitive dysfunction to schizophrenia.

Others, on the contrary, focused on the importance of metacognition for general aptitude and giftedness. Several researchers have reported significant differences in metacognitive strategy usage between intellectually gifted and average students.

Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, allows one to monitor and control cognitive processing. Metacognition is inferred when subjects accurately evaluate (either prospectively or retrospectively) performance in a cognitive task, such as a perceptual discrimination or a memory test. Non-human animals including dolphins, rats, monkeys, and apes have been reported to show metacognition. Efforts to discriminate among the variety of cognitive mechanisms that may underlie metacognition have only just begun. Some mechanisms for metacognitive performance invoke associative learning about publicly observable stimuli. Other accounts posit introspective cognitive mechanisms by which subjects have privileged access to subjective mental states.

Theoretical Framework

Metacognition is used as a collective term describing a number of phenomena, activities, and experiences related to the knowledge and control of one's own cognitive functions (e.g., perception, learning, memory, understanding, and thinking). Metacognition can be distinguished from other types of cognition by the fact that in metacognition, cognitive states or functions are the objects of reflection themselves. ‘Awareness’ constitutes a crucial element of defining metacognition.

Early definitions of the term already contain the two-component-perspective of metacognition that is still valid today, according to which knowledge about one's own cognitive functions, products, and goals on the one hand can be distinguished from control of one's own cognitive activities on the other hand. As reasonable as this distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control might be with respect to defining the term, it is insufficient as regards a description of the research area of metacognition. A distinction of at least five subcategories of metacognition has proved to be appropriate here. The first two subcategories indicate that the traditional knowledge component of metacognition shows two facets that are qualitatively distinct, that is, systemic knowledge and epistemic knowledge. The systemic knowledge domain comprehends knowledge about rules of functioning, influential factors, and strengths and weaknesses of one's own cognitive functions. If persons know under what conditions they can learn certain subjects particularly well, this indicates a high quality of their systemic knowledge. Knowledge about one's own knowledge and its gaps is principally independent from this, as well as the knowledge about knowledge acquisition and its possible use and the knowledge regarding one's own current cognitive state and willingness (disposition) to learn. These kinds of knowledge relate to the epistemic knowledge domain of metacognition.

Executive metacognitions form a third subcategory: they are identical with the control component in the traditional two-component perspective. This subcategory subsumes planning abilities, monitoring, and governing and thus the regulation of one's own cognitive activities (e.g., learning processes).

Further subcategories of metacognition have been introduced that seem adequate for consideration. On the one hand, this relates to the sensational category and to the metacognitive experience on the other. Sensation describes an awareness of one's own current possibilities of cognitive action, which is indispensible to executive monitoring processes. This sense can probably be a consequence of sufficient experience-based knowledge as well as an expression of an ‘intuitive’ sense. While this intuitive sensation need not be in any way conscious, metacognitive experiences by contrast refer to conscious cognitive sensations (e.g., ‘being confused’ about information that appears to be contradictory) or affective states regarding one's own cognitive activity (e.g., ‘being downcast’ about something you do not understand).

Conclusions

MOSST incorporates many of the principles of SST and seeks to expand their application by stimulating metacognitive activity and discussing the therapeutic relationship as it is occurring in the moment. Role-plays, which simulate the difficult real-world interactions that patients need to master, are a core aspect of MOSST. Another key element is the attention to the regulation of the therapy relationship, which makes MOSST not just a teaching experience, but a social experience in which intersubjectivity is at stake and participants jointly reflect on what is happening when different minds meet with each other during social exchanges. As a result of carrying out these role-plays and thinking about what occurred within them, it is hoped that the program promotes metacognitive capacity, specifically the mental states of the self and the others during social interaction. In this way MOSST may offer a first-line therapeutic intervention focused on self-reflection and understanding the mind of the others.

To date, MOSST has been run on small groups of patients with long-term schizophrenia in regimen of a partial hospital (Ottavi et al., in press) or with first-episode psychosis. Our observations to date are that patients will accept the treatment, and both groups enjoy it and report subjective gains in social skills and observed growth in metacognitive capacity. To date, we are lacking empirical support for these observations. In order to overcome it, we are starting with naturalistic effectiveness study of small groups with patients with both prolonged schizophrenia and first episode psychosis.

Defining Metacognition

Metacognition is defined as “thinking about thinking.” Flavell expanded this definition further, referring to the knowledge and processes involved in the appraisal, monitoring or control of cognition. The theory and application of metacognition evolved from developmental psychology but has since been applied across other domains, including ageing, memory, neuropsychology, and psychopathology. The great majority of theorists would agree in drawing a distinction between three basic aspects of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, and metacognitive control strategies. Metacognitive knowledge refers to the information that individuals hold about their own cognition and about strategies which impact on it. This knowledge provides a plan or guide for processing, the rules of which may be more (explicit) or less (implicit) amenable to conscious awareness and verbal expression. Metacognitive experiences involve the application of this knowledge to generate online appraisals and interpretations of specific mental events and processes. Metacognitive control strategies involve the execution of responses to control the activities of one's cognitive system.

I Introduction

Metacognition has been one of the most actively studied aspects of cognitive development since the seminal work of John Flavell (1976) and Ann Brown (1978), which led to an explosion of research on age-related differences in children's metacognitive skills. However, much of the developmental work has been descriptive rather than explanatory; we know that younger children differ considerably from older children, but the reasons for the differences have not been considered beyond relatively superficial levels. Nevertheless, the early work by developmental psychologists captured the attention of researchers concerned with differences in children's acquisition of academic skills. Accordingly, metacognition has often been invoked as an explanation for why younger and less able students experience difficulty in such academic domains as reading and mathematics. Researchers have conducted many comparative studies with special populations, showing how “normal” children differ from these groups in metacognition, again invoking metacognition as at least a partial explanation for lower levels of performance. Included in such comparative studies are children who are learning disabled (Short & Weissberg-Benchell, 1989), mentally retarded (Campione, 1987), and gifted (Borkowski & Peck, 1986).

The earliest research on metacognition was concerned with memory (Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Schneider, 1985), and indeed interest in metamemory is still flourishing. Metacognition has also been studied with respect to problem solving (Swanson, 1990), reasoning (Kuhn, 1989), communication (Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 1981), and attention (Miller, 1985). Within academic domains, the bulk of the research has been concerned with reading and studying (Baker & Brown, 1984; Forrest-Pressley & Waller, 1984; Garner, 1987; Paris, Wasik, & Turner, 1991). However, increasing attention has also beep directed to the role of metacognition in mathematics (Van Haneghan & Baker, 1989), writing (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1985), and science learning (Baker, 1991). In all this work, the consistent finding is that students who are more successful in a domain exhibit higher levels of metacognitive knowledge about the domain and are more skilled at regulating their cognitive processes.

Metacognition has come to play an important role in theoretical conceptualizations of intelligence. Sternberg (1986) has articulated the role most formally in his postulation of “metacomponents” that perform planning and decision-making functions, including monitoring progress. Other theorists have also invoked the construct. For example, Butterfield (1986) argued that intelligent action and learning depend on base knowledge, processing strategies, metacognitive understandings, and executive routines. And Glaser (1986) wrote that “intellectual proficiency is accompanied by the development of skilled self-regulatory (metacognitive) processes” (p. 82).

In short, the construct has had wide appeal and wide applicability, stimulating a great deal of research across a broad spectrum of psychological problems and issues. Not surprisingly, intervention programs intended for diverse populations have become widespread, designed to foster both cognitive and metacognitive skills within the domain of interest. Many of these interventions have moved beyond the laboratory into the field, sometimes with solid empirical evidence attesting to their utility and sometimes without such evidence. The popular appeal of metacognition has led to the widespread adoption and somewhat uncritical acceptance of the construct among educators. This situation is obviously problematic from a scientific standpoint and makes clear the need for further basic research on how metacognition develops, the role of metacognition in cognitive development, and how metacognition may best be fostered. Indeed, much of the research is being conducted by investigators whose primary expertise is not in the area of developmental psychology, and so the work seldom reflects a developmental perspective. This comment is not meant as a criticism of the research, but rather is intended to suggest that the time has come to reexamine the construct from the perspective of its origin, developmental psychology.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthesis of research and theorizing on the development of metacognition, with particular emphasis on mechanisms of development. Ample descriptive evidence of developmental change in metacognitive skills is available, but considerably less literature is available on factors influencing that change. The major focus in this paper is on the role that social agents, especially parents and teachers, play in fostering metacognitive development. At the same time, the importance of the child's own initiative will be considered, in recognition that children play an important role in constructing their own metacognitive knowledge. Some of the interventions that have been developed for promoting metacognitive development will also be considered. The paper begins with a discussion of theoretical conceptualizations of metacognition, proceeds to a consideration of research on fostering metacognitive development, both informally and in structured interventions, and concludes with recommendations for promoting metacognitive development that are consistent with available theory and research.

Reflection and Metacognition

A forensic examination seeks to understand and explain the events related to a crime. It is meant to be based on the evidentiary foundation created during the early stages of an overall forensic investigation. This cannot happen accidentally or thoughtlessly. It must be a deliberate effort, and requires support from the pillars of tested knowledge, careful observation, and the habit of reflection. In other words, an adequate forensic investigation requires investigators to deliberate before they determine, and to think before they act.

Thoughts and reason manifesting without reflection are going to be the result of mental habits, personal beliefs, or prejudices masquerading as insight (otherwise known as intuition). This can be good or bad, without the thinker being capable of understanding the difference. This is where metacognition plays a role.

Metacognition (aka self-monitoring) refers to “the ability to know how well one is performing, when one is likely to be accurate in judgment, and when one is likely to be in error” (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1121). At the most basic level, metacognition is best described as thinking about the process of thinking. This requires self-awareness: explicit knowledge that one exists separately from other people and full recognition of one's capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, likes, and dislikes. A solid discussion regarding the relationship between metacognition and mindfulness is provided in Preston, Stewart, and Moulding (2014, pp. 1057–1059):

Metacognition is a construct that was first articulated by John Flavell, who later defined it as “cognition about cognitive phenomena[.]” Metacognition, so named and defined, has only recently become a focus of cognitive-developmental inquiry. Often described informally as “thinking about thinking,” metacognition is the concept that individuals can monitor and regulate their own cognitive processes and thereby improve the quality and effectiveness of their thinking.

Teaching metacognitive skills to thinkers is similar to what coaches and athletic psychologists try to teach athletes. They bring to the forefront the awareness of how to maximize, and consistently tap into, all the talent and genius possessed by the player, both inherently and by the process of practice. It is the awareness and then strategic adjustment that pushes someone with flashes of brilliance into a consistently brilliant thinker who can learn, absorb, and apply new material with increasing ease.

Metacognition requires having both awareness of the process and the ability to control learning and thinking. The two components are identified as knowledge and regulation. It appears that metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation develop independently of each other. By the time students reach adulthood, most have fairly well-developed metacognitive knowledge. In contrast, metacognitive regulation, which involves “the monitoring of one's cognition and includes planning activities, awareness of comprehension and task performance, and evaluation of the efficacy of monitoring processes and strategies,” is frequently underdeveloped.

Understanding metacognition requires distinguishing it from other concepts. Metacognition is different from mindfulness, though they are related concepts. Mindfulness “generally refers to a deliberate, present-moment, non-judgmental awareness of whatever passes through the five conventional senses and the mind: emotions, thoughts, and body sensations.” Mindfulness is awareness of in-the-moment thought, while metacognition is awareness and regulation of the process of thinking, reasoning, and learning. The concepts overlap as both mindfulness and metacognition include awareness and, to some extent, self-regulation. Mindfulness is often associated with awareness of the substantive content of a person's thinking and control of emotions while metacognition is thinking of the cognitive strategies and processes used while thinking.

As this discussion would indicate, believing oneself to be competent is not enough; and awareness of how one is thinking is not enough. These thoughts are too often delusional.

Genuine metacognitive capacity requires active regulation. The forensic investigator must be capable of expressing basic and essential knowledge, skills, and abilities relating to their particular areas of evidence. They must also have some form of external assessment—whether this comes in the form of oversight from supervisors, feedback from colleagues, peer review from the community, or certifications from professional organizations. They must also have the discipline to stop or pause during the performance of their tasks; to reflect on the quality of work and results to that point; and render an honest self-evaluation.

Not everyone is equally capable when it comes to exercising metacognitive dexterity. Some are simply incompetent, perhaps even brazenly so. That is an important reality to accept. As Kruger and Dunning (1999, p. 1121) explain “[W]hen people are incompetent in the strategies they adopt to achieve success and satisfaction, they suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it. Instead … they are left with the mistaken impression that they are doing just fine.” Miller (1993, p. 4) explains: “It is one of the essential features of such incompetence that the person so afflicted is incapable of knowing that he is incompetent. To have such knowledge would already be to remedy a good portion of the offense.”

It is also cold reality that much forensic investigation occurs under circumstances that do not allow for reflection, contemplation, or the mindfulness of regulation. Consequently research into forensic casework and related reporting reveals conclusions by modern forensic experts that are sorely lacking in quality, reliability, and objectivity (Edwards & Gotsonis, 2009; Turvey, 2013). Instead, they are too often based on raw experience, incomplete evidence, unchecked assumptions, untested theories, fabricated or misunderstood statistics, poor on-the-job training, and oversimplified or fallacious arguments.

This occurs, and is allowed to occur, because those with vested interests and authority often apply pressure to get forensic results which serve their immediate purposes; and because the court gives preferential trust to government witnesses instead of requiring them to earn it (Moreno, 2004). Under these conditions, where law enforcement and prosecutors are “too wedded to the current ‘fragmented’ forensic science community, which is deficient in too many respects” (Edwards & Gotsonis, 2009, p. 18), independent thinking is frowned upon. Reflection and deliberation are, under such conditions, considered enemies.

Consider that even as this book goes to press, there are forensic professionals suing for justice, just so they can investigate and report the evidence without fear of sanction, as reported in Virtanen (2016):

Three scientists who worked at the New York State Police crime lab have sued the agency, alleging administrators retaliated against them for finding flaws in processing

DNA evidence and pushing for new testing that would identify past errors. Shannon Morris, Melissa Lee and Kevin Rafferty are seeking unspecified damages in federal court. They cited blowback for supporting the computerized DNA analysis called TrueAllele that state police began implementing then rejected.

The three scientists said that had the system remained in place, it would have exonerated “a small percentage” of suspects who were convicted using evidence involving scenes with mixed genetic material.

“There are people that are very pro-prosecution. They were putting pressure on scientists to reach conclusions that were not scientifically valid,” their lawyer, John Bailey, said Friday. “That's what my clients were objecting to.”

Morris was the associate lab director until she was fired last year. Lee and Rafferty, both lab supervisors, still work there, but faced disciplinary proceedings and have been reassigned. All worked for the state police for nearly 20 years with otherwise unblemished records, Bailey said.

Their suit alleges that they're protected from retaliation as government employees for speaking out on matters of public importance.

Those working in the forensic science community will be uncomfortably familiar with how common such circumstances are in government-funded crime labs, especially those housed within law enforcement agencies. Actual scientists inside these agencies are keenly aware of deficiencies in their methods and interpretations; they are also mindful of the need to regulate flawed methods and conclusions, to prevent them from harming justice. Yet their employers would keep them silent. The only uncommon thing about this case in New York is that forensic professionals are speaking out, publicly, and they are suing. Normally they can afford to say nothing, as the cost of speaking out requires extensive legal funding enabling the breach of employment contracts (Turvey, 2013).

As long as forensic science is “overseen” by vested individuals and organizations, there will remain little incentive for metacognitive rigor, including mindful reflection, apart from what defines the individual professional compass. There is, consequently, a deep and abiding responsibility to reflect on methods, theories, and findings before ascribing meaning to them, and certainly before putting them into a report (Edwards & Gotsonis, 2009). And to be mindful, despite pressure to do otherwise.

Metacognition

Metacognition is the ability to monitor and adaptively control one's cognitive processing or thinking about thinking. Self-awareness of one's memory serves the function of allowing individuals to avoid situations where they lack knowledge which is needed. Although research in this area in nonhuman species is relatively new, it is clear that species beyond humans are also aware of what they do and do not know.

In a typical metacognition task, subjects are given a series of increasingly difficult discriminations but can indicate that they do not know. Old World monkeys reliably perform very well, choosing the uncertain response more often when the discriminations are more difficult. All great ape species demonstrate metacognition in a task in which they tried to collect necessary information that was missing before solving a task, such as seeking out the location of food in a tube by looking into the tube before making a decision.

New World monkeys have not performed well in most metacognition tasks. However, some capuchin monkeys recently demonstrate the capacity to opt out of a memory test based on past performance suggesting they are also able to make judgments on their knowledge. Nonetheless, the monkeys do not appear to be able to monitor the detailed contents of their short-term memory as well as Old World monkeys and apes. Although additional research is needed both within the primates and in other taxonomic groups, it appears that there are taxonomic differences which are consistent with other cognitive differences between the primates.

Metacognition and Executive Functions

Metacognition and executive functioning were not routinely discussed by SLPs until recently, when work with patients with cognitive communicative disorders became more widespread. Metacognition is knowledge about all cognitive processes and involves the monitoring of these processes.19 Metacognition, then, refers to the seemingly subconscious ability to know how and when to attend, remember, and organize information and recognize and solve certain problems with certain strategies.

Executive functions refer to the skills human beings use to carry out nonroutine processes. Executive functions are thought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex in the frontal lobes. These functions include anticipation, goal direction, planning, monitoring of internal and external events, and interpretation and use of feedback. The fact that most nonroutine processes are carried out in a deliberate, coordinated manner and that human beings are typically self-regulating and able to inhibit inappropriate behaviors are testament to the executive system of the frontal lobes. The prefrontal cortex of the frontal lobes is composed of a heteromodal cortex that integrates information from both unimodal and other heteromodal areas. The frontal lobes have multiple direct and indirect connections to all other areas of the brain. They are well positioned and equipped to perform this important central executive officer job. Box 9-2 summarizes the four key concepts that the clinician should consider when performing a cognitive assessment.