Changes in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors regarding standards of right and wrong constitute

Introduction

Understanding the complexity of moral behavior, determining right from wrong, and developing one's own personal moral code are important components of adolescent development. Moral development during adolescence is facilitated by changes in social relationships, biological processes, cognitive abilities, and self-understanding. These changes provide a context that shapes the development of morality, prosocial behavior (e.g., voluntary behavior intended to benefit another such as comforting, sharing, and helping), and civic engagement. For example, in terms of social relationships, although families remain important during adolescence, peers are increasingly influential and parent–adolescent relationships change with increasing autonomy. Advances in executive functioning and regulatory control in the brain allow youth to think more abstractly and increasingly understand others' perspectives and societal views. Moreover, social problem solving and interpersonal negotiation skills advance, and this is accompanied by increased understanding of the psychological and moral self in relation to others. Based on such changes, adolescence is an important period for studying moral development. However, much of the research on adolescent moral development has focused on negative behaviors, such as aggression and delinquency, although there is a smaller body of research on adolescent moral reasoning, prosocial behavior, moral identity, and moral emotions. In this article, we draw on all of the aforementioned bodies of research, with a primary focus on adolescent moral reasoning, moral emotions, and positive behavior (i.e., prosocial behavior, empathy-related responding).

The evolution of cooperative and prosocial behavior

Evolutionary theory is useful for understanding moral behavior because it focuses on ultimate explanations regarding the origin and nature of cooperation, altruism, and pro- and antisocial behavior as well as proximate explanations regarding the mechanisms involved (such as those discussed previously). The following section briefly reviews the evolutionary origins of cooperative and prosocial behavior to highlight the importance of a science-based biopsychosocial approach to understanding human psychology.

The nature of cooperative, prosocial behavior and altruism among humans has been one of the most challenging questions in evolutionary theory and research. Humans show remarkable proclivities to cooperate in terms of child-rearing and family life, economic exchanges, religious and political practices, and military defense. Indeed, our remarkable ability to cooperate in these ways is a defining characteristic of human beings and has played an essential role in our success as a species (Krebs, 2005; Price, 2011). Humans evolved to pursue not only their own self-interest to maximize their personal chances of survival and reproduction but also their collective actions to promote the common good of the whole community. Human culture universally fosters norms for self-control, honesty, fairness, cooperation, bravery, empathy for others' distress, and subordinating the interests of the individual to those of the group (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2007; Mesoudi & Jensen, 2012). These critically important prosocial human characteristics were not predicted, however, by Darwin's theory of natural selection and the survival of the fittest.

Darwin (1859) was aware that altruism presented a serious challenge to his theory. The primary engine of adaptation by natural selection involves maximizing the fitness of individuals so that they can survive, outcompete rivals, and reproduce. Altruism necessarily benefits others at one's own expense, however, and would promptly be eliminated by natural selection. Darwin noted that “If it could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not have been produced through natural selection” (p. 190). Over a century later, E. O. Wilson (1975) regarded altruism as still “the central theoretical problem of sociobiology” (p. 3).

Explaining altruistic cooperation required a switch in focus in evolutionary theory from the reproducing individual to the replicating gene. W. D. Hamilton (1963, 1964)W. D. Hamilton (1963)W. D. Hamilton (1964) argued that the gene should be the fundamental focus of evolution and that the gene can successfully replicate not only by promoting the reproduction of its carrier but also by promoting the reproduction of any individuals who carry copies of itself. Based on this concept, Richard Dawkins (1976) noted that genes are “replicators” and individual bodies are the “vehicles” they build in order to enable themselves to replicate. So Darwin's theory was primarily a theory about the adaptation of individuals in competition to survive, while Hamilton showed that genes that promote the survival of genetic relatives increase the inclusive fitness of the kin group. Trivers (1971) hypothesized that cooperation between individuals can evolve if partners engage in mutually beneficial exchanges of altruistic acts. The return altruism may happen far into the future, but as long as one can trust that the altruism will be reciprocated, engaging in altruistic acts can be highly adaptive. There are many examples of mutually beneficial relationships between individuals and even species in nature (e.g., puppies huddling together to share body heat, and the flora that live in the human digestive tract but also provide their hosts with a range of beneficial services; Guarner & Malagelada, 2003).

Humans are unique as a cooperative species. Indeed, we are the best example of a truly reciprocally altruistic species (Trivers, 1971). Although many species of social mammals display reciprocal altruism, “genuine altruism” is primarily a human attribute (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008). Our ability to cooperate and altruistically reciprocate in very large groups on a wide variety of economic, political, religious, and cultural activities is a remarkable phenomenon that does not occur in the rest of the animal kingdom. In addition, humans have evolved mechanisms for punishing those who violate prosocial cooperative norms (e.g., “cheaters”) and those who take advantage of others' altruism but do not reciprocate by giving back (“free riders”; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003). Groups that have evolved mechanisms for internalizing these kinds of cooperative norms will outcompete groups with socially neutral or antisocial norms (Gintis et al., 2007). This is a prototypical example of gene-culture coevolution (Wilson, 1975). Culture affects the evolution of genetically controlled biological characteristics, but biology also affects the evolution of culture. Biology and culture are not independent but rather codependent realms that continually interact (e.g., humans would not exist if we had not evolved family structures that provided care for the extremely long developmental period needed by human infants and children to mature).

Our evolutionary inheritance of cognitive mechanisms for cooperation has led to humans possessing an innate and universal system of moral evaluation (Bloom, 2016; Haidt, 2001). Human babies, for example, respond to morally relevant properties of events. They display empathy and compassion by crying when they hear other babies cry and soothing others in distress. They will altruistically help out others, including strangers. They distinguish between “good guys” and “bad guys” and show clear preferences for prosocial behavior and punishment of bad behavior (Bloom, 2016). Babies are also alert to outsiders, even unfamiliar accents, and become fearful of strangers. These innate responses of Homo sapiens have unfortunately led to high levels of tribalism and mistreatment of others but also to remarkable levels of kindness, cooperation, generosity, and fairness. As Wrangham (2019, p. 3) put it, “We are not merely the most intelligent of animals … We can be the nastiest of species and also the nicest.”

We have evolved to care about ourselves, others, and the world, and the evolutionary origins of our moral reasoning and behavior are visible in many of our thoughts, feelings, and actions. Among these are our capacities for cooperation, prosocial behavior, and altruism, which are defining characteristics of humans and ultimately responsible for the unique and powerful nature of human experience and the truly remarkable accomplishments of human culture. Cooperative prosocial behavior provided humans with a distinct survival advantage. And as human communities grew over the last 10,000 years since agriculture was discovered, human relationships became more complex and culture more advanced; various internalized norms for appropriate behavior were eventually formalized and became the basis for ethical theory and law. Contemporary systems of ethical theory, law, and professional codes of ethics are the most recent incarnations of these archaic human qualities. The tragically exploitative and selfish ways that humans frequently behave toward each other are also evolved characteristics. Obviously, though, we would not have made it to the present if we had not also evolved prosocial mechanisms that ensure that we raise our very dependent young children in communities of caring families, friends, and neighbors.

3.3 Self-regulation and heroic behavior

Research on an evolutionary basis for altruism and moral behavior more generally underlines Brown's (1965) important distinction between moral thought and moral behavior. Sometimes moral behavior occurs without a great deal of thought, and at the same time, moral thinking does not guarantee what Kohlberg called “right action.” Among other things, doing the right thing may often require significant measures of psychologically effortful self-control.

Recent research on self-control or willpower (Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) details some of the internal obstacles to both moral behavior and exceptional achievement. Often doing the right or effortful thing requires inhibition, that is, restraining or overriding one response (e.g., starting an illicit affair, giving up on a frustrating task) to perform another one. As Freud wrote many years ago, inhibiting one tempting response to perform a more moral or more effective one requires what Baumeister et al. call “executive control.” Using an energy model similar to ones outlined in psychoanalytic theory, they suggest that self-control, like a muscle, can weary and wear out. As predicted by the model, people who have recently been required to exercise self-control in one situation exhibit less self-control in a later one. For example, Richeson and Shelton (2003) showed that white students who had talked about racial politics with a person of a different race, compared to white students who discussed the same topic with another white person, then performed less well on the effortful Stroop task. The students in the mixed-race condition had to exercise self-control to avoid giving offense and showed classic signs of ego depletion. In a similar study, subjects who had to resist the temptation to eat chocolates, and ate radishes instead, gave up more quickly on a frustrating task than did control subjects.

Baumeister et al. have extended their “strength model of self-control,” which emphasizes that the self-control “muscle” can become fatigued, to suggest ways that ego depletion can be countered. One is practice. Working out one's self-control capacity, like exercising any other ability (without overwhelming it), can improve one's overall ego strength and lead to better long-term self-control. This, in turn, can lead to an enhanced capacity for high levels of achievement and right action. The authors suggest, for example, that striving to alter verbal behavior, such as not saying “like” so much, or performing simple tasks with one's nondominant hand, can improve overall self-control. If self-control is a muscle, we need to think about ways to strengthen it.

Research on inhibition and self-control has given rise to a number of theories about the nature of self-regulation and ways to improve it. A recent review of the literature by Fujita (2011) argues that the effortful inhibition of impulses is not all that is involved in adaptive, moral, competent, and possibly heroic, behavior. Fujita argues that self-control is “the process of advancing distal rather than proximal motivations when the two compete” (p. 352) and that effortful impulse inhibition is only one way to accomplish that goal. For example, he discusses ways people can organize their lives to avoid temptations and ways they can automatize or routinize self-control procedures so that putting aside temptations is not so effortful, and they can then “multitask.” Another means of self-control is cognitive reconstrual, whereby temptations are thought of more abstractly, for example, a pretzel is construed as an object in a picture frame. This work does not undermine the impulse inhibition approach but suggests that there are a variety of ways that people can learn to exercise more effective and adaptive self-control.

A further element in self-regulation, perhaps more relevant to achievement than morality, is “situated optimism” (Armor & Taylor, 1998). Armor and Taylor offer an extensive discussion of the ways optimistic expectations for specific endeavors can be “expressed strategically, being somewhat more extreme in situations where they are less likely to be disconfirmed, but more modest in situations in which the potential for disconfirmation is great” (p. 310). That is, carefully controlled optimism not only can energize effective behavior in a highly adaptive way but also be calibrated to avoid devastating disappointment, personal endangerment, and wasted effort.

13.6 Social Interactions and Moral Judgments

Furtive investigation into the neurological underpinnings of social and moral behavior is a relatively recent phenomenon. This new line of study into the social decision-making capacity of VMPC patients has been advanced by the work of Koenigs and colleagues [11–13]. Koenigs and Tranel [11] tested patients with VMPC damage with the Ultimatum Game. In the Ultimatum Game, two players are given an amount of money to split, say, $10. One player (the proposer) determines how to split the money and offers a portion to the second player (the responder). The responder then decides whether or not to accept the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, then the players split the money according to the proposal. If the responder rejects the offer, then neither player receives any money. Since any amount of money is better than no money at all, a rational actor would accept any proposed offer. They found that patients with VMPC damage were more likely than normal comparison, or brain-damaged comparison, participants to reject unfair offers. It seems that the VMPC patients are unable to regulate their emotional reaction to the unfair offers as effectively as comparison participants. The authors suggest that intact VMPC functioning may be essential for rationally deciding to accept unfair offers.

In another study, Koenigs et al. [12] investigated the moral judgments of six VMPC patients. The participants in this study were asked to evaluate a set of moral dilemmas and then select the best course of action. Generally, the dilemmas involve making a sacrifice for the greater good (e.g., sacrificing a single life to save several). The experimenters hypothesized that lesions of the VMPC could lead to more utilitarian judgments because the sacrifices would not be as emotionally aversive. The VMPC patients performed no differently from the comparison groups when evaluating low-conflict dilemmas. A low-conflict dilemma is one in which one choice is clearly superior (e.g., transporting a man who is bleeding to death to the hospital even though it will stain your upholstery). The high-conflict dilemmas do not necessarily have an obviously superior choice (e.g., smothering one’s baby to save a number of people). Relative to the comparison groups, a larger proportion of the VMPC group chose to engage in the unsavory activity to resolve the high-conflict dilemmas (e.g., smothering the baby). The authors suggest that the damage to the VMPC may eliminate the emotional reaction to the thought of harming others, at which point the participant is more apt to use a utilitarian approach to maximize the aggregate welfare.

It has been found that patients suffering from frontotemporal dementia (FTD) give abnormal responses on a test of moral reasoning. In one study [14], FTD patients were presented with two versions of a classic moral dilemma. In both scenarios, there is a trolley hurtling down the tracks toward a group of five unsuspecting people who will surely die if nothing is done. In the first scenario, the participant has the option of pulling a lever to switch the trolley to a different track where there is only one bystander to be killed. In the second situation, the participant has the option of pushing a large man off of a footbridge and onto the tracks to stop the trolley. In both situations, one person dies if the participant acts, or five people die if the participant takes no action. Classically, healthy people will choose to pull the lever, but will not push a man to his death. The FTD patients in this experiment made no such distinction, endorsing both actions. As the name suggests, FTD primarily involves degradation of brain tissue in the frontal and temporal lobes. It is likely that deterioration within the VMPC contributes to the patients’ callous decision-making.

Whether we are checking our email, reading the newspaper, listening to the radio, or walking down the street, advertisers are constantly trying to influence the decisions we make. Koenigs and Tranel [13] investigated whether lesions of the VMPC could interfere with brand biasing. They used the “Pepsi paradox” to test this hypothesis. The paradox is thus: In blind taste tests, Pepsi is reliably preferred over Coke; however, Coke consistently outsells Pepsi. To test the paradox, the experimenters ran a blind and a semi-blind taste test. The blind taste test consists of two plastic cups with no brand information; one contains Pepsi and one contains Coke. The Coke semi-blind taste test involves two cups, one with brand information and one without. The unbranded cup always contains the same soda as the branded cup, but participants are told that it could contain either Coke or Pepsi (in fact, both cups always contain Coke). The Pepsi semi-blind taste test is the same, except that the cups are both filled with Pepsi. In the blind taste tests, VMPC patients and comparison participants alike showed a preference for Pepsi over Coke. The comparison participants chose labeled Coke more than labeled Pepsi in the semi-blind taste tests, reaffirming the Pepsi paradox. However, the VMPC patients chose labeled Pepsi more than labeled Coke in the semi-blind taste test, demonstrating that they were apparently unbiased by the Coke brand. A major goal of commercial advertising is to make positive emotional connections between consumers and specific brands. It seems that the ability to make these associations relies on an intact VMPC.

2 Moral essentialism in childhood and adulthood

The extant literature on moral cognition typically focuses on moral behavior, asking participants whether particular actions are good or bad, right or wrong (e.g., Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018; Dahl & Kim, 2014; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Hannikainen, Mauchery, & Cushman, 2018; Heiphetz, Spelke, & Young, 2015; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Nichols, 2002). However, recent theories suggest that laypeople's moral judgments often focus on character (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). For instance, individuals often condemn harmless acts that nevertheless serve as a cue to poor moral character, such as financial crimes whose cost is relatively minor (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). Even when the ultimate decision is held constant, participants evaluate people who make immoral decisions quickly more harshly than people who make identical decisions more slowly, arguably because quick decisions provide a better cue to immoral character (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013).

Indeed, information about moral character appears more central to social judgment than information about other types of characteristics. In one study (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), adults rated a number of targets (e.g., a close friend, Barack Obama) on traits related to morality and warmth, another characteristic that prior research has emphasized as being important to evaluations of other people (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Participants also indicated their overall impression of each target. The main finding showed that morality trait ratings predicted overall impressions better than did warmth trait ratings. In a follow-up study, Goodwin et al. (2014) found that obituaries conveyed information about the moral character of the person who had died to a greater extent than they communicated information about his or her warmth. Furthermore, the overall impression that readers formed of the person who had died after reading the obituaries was more strongly related to the morality-related content than to the warmth-related content. Because essentialist views about morality posit the existence of an internal, unchanging “essence” that underlies morally relevant behaviors, the framework of essentialism can provide greater insight into the ways in which moral judgments are based not just on morally relevant behaviors but also on perceptions of the people who perform those behaviors.

Some early work suggested that children do not make trait inferences until around age seven or later (Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Peevers & Secord, 1973; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). For instance, Rholes and Ruble (1984) compared 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds. Children heard short vignettes depicting behaviors, such as a story about a child who shared part of her lunch with a peer who had nothing to eat. They then indicated their expectations for how the character would behave in future situations relevant to the demonstrated trait. In the example above, participants answered whether the character would behave generously in the future (e.g., whether she would spend all of her play time helping another child perform a chore). Older children were more likely than younger children to report consistent behaviors (e.g., that a child who shared with a hungry peer would also behave generously with her time by helping a different peer perform a chore). Results such as these have been interpreted as indicating that younger children are less likely than older children to make a trait-based inference. Here, for instance, younger children appeared less likely to form the impression that the character was “generous” and use this impression to conclude that the character would therefore behave generously across a variety of situations.

If younger children do, indeed, experience difficulty drawing trait-based inferences, then they would not be expected to view morality in an essentialist way because they would not understand morally relevant behaviors as arising from internal, unchanging characteristics. However, more recent work using less complex methodologies has shown that even young children make trait inferences (see Heyman, 2009, for a review). For instance, children as young as four years old predict future behaviors on the basis of trait labels, despite the fact that they do not always predict future behaviors on the basis of past behaviors (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). In this case, providing the label (e.g., “smart”) may simplify the task for children, whereas describing a past behavior (e.g., performing well on an exam) in the absence of a label may make the task more difficult.

These trait inferences extend to moral traits. In one project, children in elementary school reported that a change to moral characteristics—particularly moral beliefs that are shared with most other people, such as whether or not it is okay to hurt another person for no reason—would lead to greater changes in identity than changes to characteristics that were not morally relevant, such as preferences (Heiphetz, Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018). In a separate line of work, children in elementary school completed a switched-at-birth task in which they learned about a baby who was birthed by one mother but subsequently raised by a different mother. Here, children predicted that targets would share the moral characteristics of their birth parent rather than their adoptive parent, despite lacking any social interaction with the birth parent (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). In a third series of studies, children as young as kindergarten age predicted that characters’ future behaviors would match the valence of past behaviors (e.g., that a character who had behaved antisocially would continue to do so; Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997; Heller & Berndt, 1981). Children in these studies may have attributed the initial behavior to an antisocial “character” or “essence” that would cause the person to perform additional antisocial behaviors as well. Taken together, these studies indicate that children apply various components of essentialist thought (e.g., the notion that the relevant characteristic is central to identity, rooted in biology, and unchanging over time) to morality.

Although children appear to view moral characteristics in an essentialist way, they also appear to distinguish between differently valenced moral characteristics. Specifically, they typically view morally good characteristics in more essentialist terms than morally bad characteristics. For instance, in one study, children indicated which characteristics would transfer from donor to recipient in the case of a heart transplant. Four- to five-year-olds expected positive characteristics, such as niceness, to transfer more than negative characteristics, such as meanness (Meyer, Gelman, Roberts, & Leslie, 2017). In other words, preschoolers judged that positive characteristics were more connected to an internal, biological source (the heart) than were negative characteristics. In another study, children in elementary school viewed prosocial behaviors as more stable over time than anti-social behaviors (Heyman & Dweck, 1998). In a third line of work, 5- to 8-year-olds (as well as adults, in this project) were more likely to endorse essentialist views of moral goodness than of moral badness (Heiphetz, 2019). This research is consistent with studies showing that children tend to be optimistic even in domains that are not morally relevant. For instance, 5- to 6-year-olds are more likely than older participants to expect negative characteristics, such as having poor vision or being a poor learner, to change over time; however, 5- to 6-year-olds, like older children and adults, expect positive traits to persist across a person's lifetime (Lockhart, Nakashima, Inagaki, & Keil, 2008; see also Boseovski, 2010; Diesendruck & Lindenbaum, 2009; Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002).

Although research on moral cognition often asks participants to judge behaviors, emerging evidence suggests that people may also attend to the internal characteristics of the people who perform those behaviors. Early evidence suggested that internally focused evaluations may be limited to older children and adults, as younger children appeared to experience difficulty drawing inferences based on internal traits. However, more recent research has shown that even children in early elementary school draw trait-based inferences under some circumstances (e.g., when the researcher explicitly provides the relevant label, such as referring to a particular person as “smart” or “good”). Of most relevance to work on moral essentialism, recent work at the intersection of cognitive development and moral psychology has suggested that even preschoolers and children in elementary school view morality in an essentialist way. In particular, children are especially likely to view moral goodness as arising from an internal, unchanging, biological “essence” that constitutes a person's identity.

Of course, moral essentialism does not constitute an isolated cognitive phenomenon. Rather, it is possible to ask both about its antecedents (e.g., what processes might give rise to essentialism regarding morality) and its consequences. Several possible answers to these questions are described below.

A six-category taxonomy of individual differences in moral character

Collecting a list of individual differences constructs in the production of moral behavior began to reveal differing psychological capacities researchers had identified as part of the moral process. Grouping the constructs helped us discover that multiple and differing capacities are important. Grouping the constructs also helped us discover which capacities those were.

Table 1 shows six resulting categories. They correspond roughly to differing psychological capacities in the production of moral behavior. They also may reflect successive psychological steps in the process. Typical, conscious moral behavior likely requires the initial recognition of the relevance of the situation to morality, then making a judgment as to the correct moral action in the situation, finding the motivation in affect or one's identity to carry out that action, having the moral courage and follow-through to actually enact the action, and finally enacting the action. Some of these steps might be skipped in unusual cases, such as habitual or compulsory moral actions, and the order of steps may vary, including recursive elements.

Table 1. A six-category taxonomy of individual differences intended to explain or describe moral behavior.

Moral Awareness

Moral Attentiveness

Need for moral cognition

Moral Chronicity

Justice Sensitivity

Deontic Justice

Moral Sensitivity

Moral Expansiveness

Speciesism

Moral Disengagement

Note. Constructs are discussed in the text in the above order. Because we selected constructs with associated measures, please see the relevant text for information about those associated measures to use to assess the constructs. In each case, the measure is explicitly mentioned, or it is included in the article that introduced the construct.

Individual differences have been proposed in each of these categories. Individual differences in perception of moral relevance refer to differences in the readiness to see situations as morally relevant and the breadth of situations seen to be morally relevant. Seeing more situations as morally relevant might lead to enacting more moral behaviors. Individual differences in judgment of correct behavior refer to differences in the ethical positions people take, the ethical values they hold, and the reasoning processes they employ to make judgments. The judgments individuals make about the morally correct action should influence the action they ultimately choose. Individual differences in affective prompts and inhibitors refer to individual differences in emotions experienced when contemplating actions differing in ethical value. Affect might provide psychological force to enact the behavior. Individual differences in identification with morality or others refer to individual differences in the extent to which one sees oneself as a moral person or to the extent one sees oneself as interdependent with others. Such identities might also provide force to enact moral judgments. Individual differences in moral-courage and follow-through refer to the ability or courage to carry out the moral action. Having courage and ability might lead to actually enacting the moral action. Finally, individual differences in enacted morality refer to individual differences in the extent to which the person actually acts in morally correct ways or not.

The categories in this taxonomy are not meant to be defined by necessary and sufficient criteria into nonoverlapping groups. Rather, the categories overlap somewhat, and some individual differences may blend two or more of the categories. Nonetheless, we believe the categories provide a useful and fairly accurate account of individual differences identified to explain or describe moral behavior, and thus they facilitate research on the dynamic processes underlying moral behavior.

As acknowledged, this taxonomy is informed by and builds on existing models of morality. Table 2 shows the categories in our taxonomy and roughly corresponding categories in other models.

Table 2. Comparison of the proposed taxonomy with earlier taxonomies.

Note. Italics indicates that the theorist's category spans multiple categories in our taxonomy.

In one of the first proposed models, Hogan (1973) conceptualized moral character as having five components. In Hogan's model, moral knowledge refers to the knowledge of moral rules; socialization and autonomy both refer to the degree to which rules are internalized; empathy refers to identifying with other people's perspectives, which is considered to be a sensitivity to the needs of others; and the ethics of responsibility versus conscience refers to a decision rule for making moral judgments. This model emphasizes individual differences in rule-governed behavior, and as such focuses on individual knowledge of and compliance with moral rules. It is one of the first models to bring the importance of identity to attention. However, in the years since Hogan's review, a great deal of work has focused on recognition of moral relevance, affect, and follow-through as also important to morality, so we expand the Hogan (1973) model to include those categories.

The Jennings et al. (2015) model has a lot in common with our taxonomy, coming to very similar conclusions as to how to divide the various components of individual differences in morality (overlapping in five of the six categories). However, they limit consideration to the “moral self,” which they define as “a complex system of self-defining moral attributes” (p. S106). Thus, they may be limiting their taxonomy to those characteristics that are self-defining, whereas we are including individual differences that are not necessarily self-defining. Their model has an additional three components where they include other “individual factors,” which we include within the six categories of our taxonomy. The Jennings et al. (2015) model was intended as an integrative process model of morality, not to serve as an organizing taxonomy of individual differences in morality.

Cohen and Morse (2014) proposed a Tripartite Framework of moral character, which comprises identity, ability, and motivation. Though these categories were established by predicting ethical behaviors in the workplace (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014), this model should be predictive of moral behaviors in any context. In this model, identity refers to the centrality and importance of morality to one's self-concept (Cohen & Morse, 2014). Ability refers to ability to regulate one's behavior such that one engages in moral behaviors and avoids immoral behaviors. Lastly, the motivational component of moral character refers to considerations for others and includes characteristics such as moral disengagement, moral foundations, empathy, and honesty/humility.

Our taxonomy overlaps with the Tripartite Framework, with the identity and ability components reflected in the identification with morality or others and the moral courage and follow-through categories, respectively. However, our taxonomy makes more fine-grained distinctions with respect to the motivational component, resulting in more categories with more constructs in each. Specifically, our taxonomy includes independent categories for individual differences in moral recognition, moral judgment, moral affect, and enacted moral behavior. In addition, we place traits such as conscientiousness and honesty/humility in the descriptive category of moral enactment rather than the ability and motivation categories, because we believe those latter categories are better captured by more specific individual differences that relate to latent ability and to latent energizing forces than by broad traits.

Three process models also align to some extent with the taxonomy. Rest's Four-Component Model (1986), Narvaez et al.’s (2003) model of ethical expertise, and Latané and Darley's model of helping (1970; see also Halmburger, Baumert, & Schmitt, 2017a) are process-oriented frameworks comprising steps required to bring about moral behavior, rather than taxonomies of individual differences. In the Rest model, the first step is interpreting the situation, especially concerning moral issues and consequences of action for others. The second step is the judgment of correct action. The third step is moral action intention and refers to the motivation to carry out the morally correct action by reasoning, learning, affect, or identity. The fourth step is executing and implementing the action. The Narvaez, Bock, and Endicott model is a revision of the Rest model, focusing on individual differences in expertise, with similar components. The Latané and Darley model is also similar, starting with witnessing an event and interpreting it as an emergency, proceeding to judging the situation as requiring the individual's action, and finishing with making a decision to act.

Personal factors and social identity

Social identity has been found to influence a number of personal factors, ranging from moral behavior to positive development. In relation to moral behavior, Bruner, Boardley, and Côté (2014) used Cameron’s (2004) model with a sample of high school team sport athletes to demonstrate an association between athletes’ positive feelings toward the team (i.e., in-group affect) and the frequency of prosocial behavior toward teammates. Follow-up research by Bruner et al. (2018) attempted to disentangle the individual and group level process of social identification on moral behavior in a sample of competitive youth ice hockey players. Multilevel analysis demonstrated that athlete’s perceptions of belonging (i.e., in-group ties) and importance of membership (i.e., cognitive centrality) predicted prosocial behavior toward teammates. Interestingly, the complexity of the social identity–antisocial behavior relationship was also highlighted, whereby increased perceptions of cognitive centrality at the team level predicted antisocial behavior toward opponents as well as teammates.

Several studies have extended this line of research by exploring the impact of social identity with youth using qualitative and daily diary approaches. First, using stimulated recall, it was found that all athletes—regardless of reported frequency of intrateam antisocial behavior—felt prosocial interactions with teammates enhanced social identity (Bruner, Boardley, Forrest, et al., 2017). Similarly, using semi-structured interviews and a narrative analysis with youth athletes, a reciprocal relationship between social identity and intrateam moral behavior was found, such that young athletes’ social identities developed through team membership could both influence, and be influenced by, their moral behavior toward teammates. Results also introduced three distinct narratives that were gleaned from the discussions with athletes: (1) family-oriented team narrative (i.e., closely-knit teams were described as family-like, and relationships and support were prioritized over performance, resulting in increased social identity), (2) performance-oriented team narrative (i.e., team performance was at the forefront and social identity perceptions fluctuated with the success of the team), and (3) dominance-oriented team narrative (i.e., competition and status were central, resulting in frequent antisocial behavior toward team members and diminished social identity; Bruner, Boardley, Allen, et al., 2017). Finally, and utilizing the novel approach of analyzing daily diary responses, Benson and Bruner (2018) found athletes who reported more frequent daily experiences of prosocial behaviors to report higher social identity strength in comparison to those who reported more frequent antisocial behaviors.

In addition to moral behavior, social identity strength can have considerable implications for athlete development. For example, Bruner, Balish, et al. (2017) examined the relations between social identity and positive youth development. Both in-group ties and in-group affect were positively related to personal and social skills (Bruner, Balish, et al., 2017). Additionally, in-group ties predicted athletes’ initiative, whereas in-group affect positively associated with goal setting and negatively associated with deleterious athletic experiences. Follow-up work by Martin, Balderson, Hawkins, Wilson, and Bruner (2018) determined that athletes’ perceptions of in-group ties predicted commitment and perceived effort, while in-group affect predicted commitment and self-worth in youth athletes. Therefore, the empirical evidence between social identity and developmental attributes appears to be positive in nature; however, the relations between social identity and moral behavior do not present such clarity.

Kantian Ethics

In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argues that moral behavior is guided by the categorical imperative, which has several formulations. The first two formulations, “act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” and “act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature,” (422) require us to act according to the dictates of universality and reversibility. The maxim, or reason behind our action, should be one that we could wish to be practiced universally by others (universality) and one that we could reasonably wish to be on the receiving end of (reversibility). This would clearly support a right against discriminatory treatment, for example, because one could not reasonably wish that discrimination be practiced universally, and especially not toward oneself.

The third formulation, found in Kant’s Foundations, states that we should “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (429). This calls attention to the fact that ethics goes beyond abstract principles and deals directly with the dignity of human persons. It also goes beyond the natural rights tradition in emphasizing that ethics includes duties toward self and not simply duties toward others.

In his Foundations, Kant focused his attention more on duty, saying that “the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty” (400). Kantian and neo-Kantian ethics would certainly include those rights consistent with the categorical imperative. Concerning rights to abortion and euthanasia, for example, one would have to consider the maxim behind the desired act and subject it to the principles of universality, reversibility, and the dignity of persons. Desiring an abortion based simply on the sex of the child, for example, would not satisfy such principles and would most likely be rejected by this tradition. However, a right to a ‘therapeutic’ abortion (e.g., where the life of the mother is threatened and the fetus will die in any case) could be supported. Obviously, the dignity of persons criterion requires one to consider also the status of the fetus: Is it a full-fledged person? Also, a right to euthanasia based on economic hardship (because the medical technology needed for sustaining life is costly) will be less legitimate in this tradition than in those grounded in respect for the patient’s wishes to die with dignity. Kantian ethics is often cited as an example of positive rights theory. It is clear that Kant himself, especially in his emphasis on moral duty, would reject any exclusive negative rights view.

The Relationship Between Morality and Legality

From a TMT perspective, awareness of death creates a need to establish and adhere to culturally defined moral behaviors, as we invest in and defend our cultural worldviews. This may occur in the form of living up to moral or legal standards of value. Legality and morality both channel and guide individual behavior and represent formal and informal methods of social control; i.e., they are regulators of human conduct. Laws, which are formal and explicit means of social control, embody the legal rules set forth in society that define unacceptable behavior and the consequences of legal disobedience. Behaviors that are legally forbidden may already be acts that individuals refrain from engaging in due to their belief system (e.g., stealing from someone). When we act in accordance with moral rules, we feel virtuous and may be praised by others, while conversely, when we violate moral standards, we may feel guilt and others may dislike and disapprove of our behavior (Shavell, 2002). Thus morality reflects a more informal approach to social control where universal values are adopted that influence and guide behavior.

However, morality may not always fully regulate behavior in consistent ways within a society. This may occur because cultural worldviews are subjective social constructions, and some individuals may possess worldviews that value engaging in highly self-motivated actions (e.g., taking anything one wants to fulfill material desires, or acting aggressively to demonstrate the culturally valued attribute of strength) that may have harmful consequences for others. Thus laws are imposed to provide regulation of behaviors typically consistent with the worldviews of a majority of citizens. Laws guide our behavior, may serve to alter our moral beliefs, and largely exist to regulate morality (Shavell, 2002).

Although our cultural worldviews are generally developed by the values and social constructs set forth in society, standards regarding morality and behavior may be shaped by legal rules. For example, there may be opposing views on the morality of certain acts, such as sexuality or drug use, but in the end, the law determines whether behavior is permissible or not within a society. This may lead an individual to refrain from engaging in a behavior one does not see as morally wrong (e.g., seeking the services of a prostitute). Thus, in some cases, laws may supersede morality. However, in other instances, an individual may know an act is illegal, but may not feel that it is a moral transgression, and may engage in that behavior (e.g., recreational drug use).

From a worldview defense standpoint, when we are reminded of our mortality, we need both legal and moral guidance to know what actions we can take to assuage our fears about death. That is, laws dictate what form of worldview defense may be appropriate to utilize (e.g., criticism and derogation of worldview threating others, as opposed to committing violent acts against them). Ultimately, the legal system serves as a mechanism to control and punish immoral behavior. Consequently, there are rich connections between TMT and legal issues. However, the TMT–legal relationship has been shown to be complex at times and broad in nature (Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon, 2005). To that end, MS has been found to influence many aspects related to the commission, prosecution, and punishment of offenses.

Karma

The doctrine of karma is concerned with the ethical implications of Dharma, particularly those relating to the consequences of moral behavior. Karma may be defined as a principle of moral retribution in terms of which good and bad deeds bring about pleasant and unpleasant consequences in the future as well as a transformation in the agent’s present moral status. The remote effects of karmic choices are referred to as the ‘maturation’ (vipaka) or ‘fruit’ (phala) of the karmic act. Performing good and bad deeds is compared to planting seeds that will fruit at a later date. Good karma is often referred to as ‘merit’ (punya) and its opposite, bad karma, as ‘demerit’ (papa). Some Buddhists go to extreme lengths to accumulate merit, for example, by making large donations to the sangha or funding lavish construction projects for the building of temples and the like.

Belief in karma is common to many Indian religions and did not originate with the Buddha. Because it is one of the givens of Indian thought, rarely does the Buddha seek to justify or defend the idea of karma explicitly. However, the notion permeates his teachings and frequent reference is made to it in the early discourses. There, the Buddha reserves a particular censure for those of his contemporaries – such as materialists, determinists, and others – who denied the belief that moral acts had consequences (this was known as akiryavada or ‘the doctrine of non-retribution’). Karma is not the same as determinism, and the doctrine of karma does not claim that everything that happens to a person is determined in advance. Instead, many of the good and bad things that happen in life can simply be accidents. Karma thus does not determine precisely what will happen or how anyone will react to what happens.